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Abstract
This paper explores the effect of incentive pay on gender pay gaps in
Finland, Norway and Sweden among professionals and managers within
MNCs. Mercer 2009 Total Remuneration Survey data is utilised. Uni-
form job ladder, occupation, industry and wage definitions enable con-
sistent cross-country comparisons. In addition to the between-country
variation, the within-country variation of gender gap with respect to in-
centive pay is analysed. The results indicate that gender pay gaps differ
among the Nordics and that occupation and industry controls have dis-
similar effects across countries. Irrespective of wage element, Finland and
Norway are characterised by higher gender gaps than Sweden. Incentives
tend to accentuate gender pay gaps. In intention to alleviate the absence
of job performance data, this study utilises a rudimentary, promotion-
based measure for job performance. In Finland it does affect the gender
gap. However, irrespective of gender, high-performers are penalised in
Sweden but not in Finland or Norway. The Finnish data also allows the
identification of low-performers. Low job performance is rewarded in Fin-
land. Nonetheless, the job performance findings should be interpreted
with cautions.
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1 Introduction
Gender pay gap continues to attract considerable interest. Although the gaps
have narrowed since 1970s, male employees still enjoy substantial wage pre-
miums practically across societies. After decades of decline, the majority of
OECD countries have witnessed plateauing gaps since the late 1990s (Blau &
Kahn, 2000). In certain countries the trend has even reversed albeit marginally.
Various explanations have been put forth to provide convincing narratives for
these patterns – industrial changes, shifts in labour participation rates and the
decline of unions, for example. One candidate is the widespread adoption of
performance pay, as it has been shown to drive income inequality, especially in
the top-end of the wage distribution (Lemieux et al., 2009). Could performance
pay also explain movements in gender gaps? The findings presented in Rica
et al. (2010) suggest that performance pay is not gender-neutral.
Nordic countries constitute an intriguing backdrop to explore the effects of
incentive pay on gender gaps. The societies and their heritage of employee
relations share much in common – interventionist labour market policies, low
wage inequality and strong trade unions – which allows to reflect gender pay
issues in comparably similar institutional contexts. In fact Nordic countries
demonstrate how similar labour market institutions can give rise to distinct
patterns of gender equality.
According to Eurostat, the 2008 unadjusted pay gap in the Nordic coun-
tries ranged between Finland’s 20% and Sweden’s 17.1%. Norway held the
middle position with 17.2%. By European standards the Nordic figures are
at average. While the EU27 has an mean gap of 17.6%, the comparison does
not account for the differences in female workforce participation rates between
countries. Indeed, after labour participation, human capital and occupational
characteristics have been controlled for, Nordic countries usually witness the
lowest unexplained gaps. Most studies put the unexplained gender wage gap at
5 to 10% in the Nordic countries (see Korkeama¨ki & Kyyra¨, 2006; Rosholm &
Smith, 1996; Milgrom et al., 2001; Petersen et al., 1997).
Gender gap literature is abundant on national level yet comparative cross-
country studies remain scarce. Most likely this stems from the lack of datasets
with standardised occupations, job ladders, education levels and wage defini-
tions. Hence consistent cross-country gender gap estimates with employee ben-
efits, short- and long-term incentives (henceforth STI and LTI, respectively) are
in relatively short supply.
This study explores gender wage gaps in Finland, Norway and Sweden in
2009 using comparable datasets1 with particular focus on incentive pay. As
the sample mostly represents professional and managerial employees, the results
may not generalise to blue-collar workers – indeed James et al. (2003) showed in
1The matched employer–employee data is based on Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish Mer-
cer Total Remuneration Surveys for 2009. In order to ensure consistency among different
jobs across countries, all positions have been evaluated using Mercer’s International Position
Evaluation (IPE) system. Instead of this obscure abbreviation, the term ‘job ladder’ is used
throughout the text for IPE.
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the Swedish setting that gender gap is increasing along the wage distribution.
Similar results have been found in Finland (Arulampalam et al., 2007). All
organisations operate on the private sector and the sample is skewed towards
Nordic and global multinational corporations (MNCs). Hence the results are
unlikely to apply outside the Nordic white-collar private sector.
As stated, this study explores the influence of incentive pay on gender gaps.
STIs, LTIs and employee benefits are compounded to estimate the gender gaps
in total compensation. Incentives are also briefly covered at the policy level
– namely, the provisions of incentive schemes are explored from the gender
perspective.
This dataset contains detailed job ladder information for all professional
and managerial employees in a cross-country context. Consistent job ladders
for managers are often absent as in Korkeama¨ki & Kyyra¨ (2006). Or they
are somewhat coarse to capture the elaborate structures and responsibilities
of modern organisations as in Asplund et al. (2008). Strong empirical and
theoretical arguments speak for detailed job ladders as firms utilise them in the
wage setting process (Lazear & Rosen, 1990; Baker et al., 1994).
Data on employees’ job performance is not available. To alleviate this defi-
ciency, a very tentative, promotion-based attempt to quantify the effect of job
performance on pay is made. In short, employees with particularly fast or slow
promotion patterns are identified. One interest is job performance’s effect on
the gender gap. However, as will turn out the performance premium itself is
much more intriguing than the gender perspective.
This paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
specifies the econometric model. Section 4 briefly explores incentive pay policies
in the Nordics. Section 5 presents the findings. Section 6 takes a slight detour
to the effects of job performance. Section 7 concludes. Tables and figures are
in the Appendix.
2 Data
The data is based on Mercer2 2009 Total Remuneration Surveys. Summary
of sample statistics are given in Table (1). The samples for Finland, Norway
and Sweden are comparable in most respects. They cover similar companies
and share consistent definitions of pay elements. Occupational, industry and
job ladder coding adhere to Mercer’s standards. However, there are some dis-
similarities. Finnish and Swedish sample sizes are much higher than Norway’s.
Furthermore, only Finnish data contains information of employees’ education
levels. The lack of education data for Norway and Sweden would a priori look
like a serious misfortune. Yet as the Finnish sample demonstrates, the absence
of education data does not compromise the robustness of the results in Norway
and Sweden.
The sample includes multiple pay elements. Those covered in this study are
fixed pay, STIs and LTIs and benefits. Three pay aggregates are composed. The
2Mercer is a wholly owned subsidiary of Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc.
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first includes only fixed pay3. The second adds STIs which represent payments
subject to previous year’s individual and/or company performance. The third,
total compensation, compounds the previous with LTIs and benefits. LTIs
represent share options, performance shares and cash plans. They have been
valuated with Black & Scholes method and are thus sensitive to assumptions
about interest rates, dividends and share volatility. Benefits are included by
their taxation-value or cost. Due to uncertainties regarding valuations of the
LTIs, the total compensation figures are less reliable than fixed pay w/wo STIs
which are based on actual payments.
Job ladders are instrumental in corporate wage setting (Pekkarinen & Rid-
dell, 2008; Baker et al., 1994). Mercer IPE uses organisational layer, financial
accountability, management breadth and skill requirements to determine the
job ladder. Due to global standardisation, they are consistent across firms,
occupations and countries. Although companies vary in their organisational
structures, typically the difference between vertical layers translate in 2 to 3
job ladders. A given manager is therefore 2 to 3 job ladders above its direct
subordinates. Among professional positions, the interval equates to 1 level of
seniority. Promotions, then, typically yield an increase of 2 to 3 job ladders.
Stylised links between job ladders and titles are given in Table (1). Job ladders
are typically assigned without information of employees’ wage, gender or other
individual attributes. As can be observed from Figure (1), in Nordic corpo-
rations clerical employees and junior professionals are predominantly women,
senior professionals and managers men. This polarisation is starkest in Finland
where female top executives are virtually absent. Norwegian corporations are
most gender-balanced.
Occupational codes adhere to classification which broadly resembles Stan-
dard Occupational Classification (SOC) used extensively in the U.S. Industry
codes are similarly related to the North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS). Countries are divided into geographical regions according to their rel-
evant labour market structures. Finland is composed of three, Norway of eight
and Sweden of five regions.
Education information is only available for the Finnish data. It reflects
employee’s highest educational attainment. The levels match UNESCO’s In-
ternational Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Due to compulsory
primary education in Finland, observations with only pre-primary education
(level 0) are absent. Hence only six of seven official ISCED levels are present.
Finnish education data is used to show that – conditional on having sufficient job
ladder and occupational information – it does not have significant impact on the
gender wage gap. Since education systems are fairly comparable across Nordic
countries, the findings regarding Finland should generalise in this respect.
Most employer–employee datasets lack direct information on individual abil-
ity or cognitive skill. This dataset is no exception. Whether this gives rise
to significant omitted variable bias, is debated in the literature (Blackburn &
Neumark, 1993). However, in some respect even more important and related in-
3Overtime payments and commissions are omitted.
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formation is often absent: productivity or job performance. Since performance
reviews frequently form the basis of merit pay increases in corporations, their
absence may contribute to omitted variable bias. This study utilises interaction
terms which should at least loosely correspond to a high or low job performance.
The proposed method is arguably rudimentary: individuals who are promoted
to executive positions – job ladder above 60 – under the age of 40 are considered
high-performers. Low-performers are identified by interacting job ladder, age
and education. In particular, employees above the age of 40 with job ladder
below 52 and master’s degrees are denoted low-performers4. These employees,
then, have experienced below-average promotion patterns despite being highly
educated.
Although these promotion-based performance indicators discriminate by age,
two factors speak for them. First, these measures do not directly hinge on per-
formance evaluations which can be subjective. Second, they are quite objective
since competition should ensure that MNCs promote on merits. Hence to some
extent promotion patterns reflect individuals’ actual performance over long pe-
riods of time. Yet the approach is rudimentary, and hence the results should be
interpreted with reservations.
3 Estimated model
This study make use of the human capital approach originally proposed by
Mincer (1970). The wage model is estimated by using ordinary least squares
(OLS). Regression models have the following functional form
lnWi = β0 +Xiβ + µi (1)
where Xi includes all human capital, occupational, industry and performance
characteristics, β is a vector of coefficients and i ∈ {1, ..., N} denotes the number
of observation. Job ladder, age and tenure has been included in quadratic
terms as is typical in the field. Several model specifications are presented using
different controls to distinguish the individual effects of variables.
As the objective is to disentangle the role of incentives, (1) is estimated on
each pay element separately. There are few caveats, however. First, the set
of firms implementing incentive pay schemes are most likely not random. For
instance, they might be more aware of gender issues and thus apply equal pay
policies that alleviate wage gaps. Since practically every firm in the data has an
incentive scheme in operation, this sample bias would result in under-estimate
of the gender gap. Second, within firms employees are not necessarily assigned
to incentive schemes by chance. Higher ability individuals might be offered
incentive plans more frequently than others. Provided that this is independent
of gender, estimates of wage gaps would remain unbiased.
Estimation of wage regressions are notoriously prone to endogeneity resulting
from unobserved variables. In this study the lack of ability or productivity
4Low-performers could only be identified for Finland since the Norwegian and Swedish
datasets do not contain education.
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variables might bias the estimates since they probably influence both the error
term and job ladder. However, its effect on gender gap might be ambiguous.
Pekkarinen & Riddell (2006) has shown that in Finland female employees might
be more productive than males at a given job ladder because the former face a
higher promotion threshold. Hence conditional on job ladder and other observed
variables, gender wage gap might be under-estimated if employers compensate
females for their higher productivity.
To certain extent even occupations and industries might be subject to en-
dogeneity. Higher ability individuals could opt for occupations that are charac-
terised by better pay. And it is not unreasonable to assume that some ability
stratification might take place also across industries. In fact anecdotal evidence
suggest that this kind selection process can be observed – for example, in United
Kingdom finance and banking firms are generally believed to cream off high abil-
ity labour. Yet as with other potential sources of endogeneity, provided that this
possible selection bias is not gender-specific, wage gap estimates would remain
unbiased.
The potential deficiencies addressed above should not devalue inferences in
the between-country context. Given comparable labour market institutions in
the Nordics, it is reasonable to expect that the omitted variables have broadly
similar effects across countries.
4 Incentive pay policies
Since one key objective of this study is to disentangle the role of incentives on the
gender pay gaps, they should be discussed in detail. This is important especially
with respect to STIs. First, not all employees are granted incentives. Second,
their value is often defined as a share of fixed wage. Third, incentives yielding
equal monetary compensation at the target-level5 might result in substantially
divergent expected values as probability of reaching that level depends on firm-
specific budgeting policies.
The first two issues can be estimated since the data contains information
of eligibilities and target-level payments for STIs. However, the third is less
clear and can not directly be investigated. In theory the strictness could be
estimated from the ratio of target-level and actual incentives but the results
might be distorted by exogenous factors such as economic fluctuations.
Out of these three factors which determine the expected values of incen-
tive plans, the first two can be assessed in gender perspective. First, do male
and female employees differ in eligibilities of STIs given their human capital,
occupation and industry characteristics? Second, are there any differences in
target-level incentives?
Since the data contains information on the target-level STIs as a share of
fixed wage, policy-level gender-biases can be estimated with (1) by treating the
target-level incentive as the dependent variable. Estimates of these are presented
5Target-level typically means that budget is met or individual performance is at the average
level in the given position.
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in Table (2). The results indicate a diverging pattern between countries. Finland
and Sweden have virtually no gender gap but Norway has statistically significant
2 percentage points. Since the median STI of fixed wage is 10% in Norway, the
figure represents substantial gender gap in the provision of incentives. However,
with absolute target-level STIs each country would have shown a gender gap –
yet that would reflect the gap in fixed wages, not in incentive policies.
The previous examined the magnitude of STIs relative to fixed wages for
observations with target-levels reported. Yet the eligibilities might still vary by
gender. This was tested by using logistic regression on the prevalence of STIs.
In Finland and Norway men are 24 and 11%, respectively, more likely to be
eligible for STIs. Norway’s gap is insignificant, however. In Sweden men are
23% less likely to be eligible for STIs.
In short, it seems that Nordic countries differ slightly in their provision of
STIs by gender. Finland has virtually no gap in target-levels but substantial
gap in eligibility. In Norway men have both higher relative target-level STIs
and eligibilities. Sweden has equal relative target-level STIs but lower eligibility
among male employees. However, OLS estimations with incentives are based
on actual STIs and include also employees who are not eligible for incentives.
The brief discussion above concerns the incentive policies – whether there are
qualitative or quantitative differences in the provisions of STIs between sexes.
Table (2) also shows the frequency of LTI provision among Nordic MNCs.
As can be seen, the eligibilities are rather low. Since men occupy the highest
echelons of the corporate ladders – Figure (1) is quite convincing indication of
this – they are also granted LTIs disproportionately. LTIs contribute to gender
gaps, but their effect is somewhat limited by the extent of their provision.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Fixed wage
Fixed wage OLS gender gaps are shown on Table (3). It indicates that Nordic
countries experience differences in gender gaps. Irrespective of the controlled
dummies, Finland shows consistently the highest and Sweden the lowest gender
gaps. Norway comes in the middle.
Estimates with the most narrow set of controls – Model (1) – yields gender
gap estimates of .062, .059 and .021 for Finland, Norway and Sweden, respec-
tively. These show that absent occupational and industry controls, Finland and
Norway experience substantially higher gender gaps than Sweden. This is quite
interesting result since the latter’s raw wage gap was found to be around the
Nordic average. It already suggest that in Sweden the human capital endow-
ments – most notably job ladder – explain larger majority of the gender wage
gap than in other Nordic countries. Naturally they explain substantial part of
the gap in Finland and Norway but in these cases human capital endowments
have slightly less marked effect.
As is implied from the R2 figures, this narrow set of controls can already
7
explain substantial share of the variation in fixed pay. This supports the argu-
ment put forward previously that job ladders determine pay in Nordic MNCs
considerably. In fact studies done with U.S. data employing job ladders have
evidenced similarly high R2 levels (Baker et al., 1994).
With full set of controls, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish gaps are .066, .039
and .032, respectively. The between-country differences are statistically signif-
icant and suggest that Nordic countries experience genuinely distinct gender
wage gaps.
However, it is interesting to note that the additional controls – Models (2)
and (3) – have somewhat dissimilar effects across countries. In Finland occupa-
tion and industry dummies leave fixed wage gender gap unchanged. Since sex
segregation is abundant in Finland – as is documented for example in Melkas
& Anker (1997) – wage spreads across occupations and industries must conse-
quently be limited. Norway experiences a declining pattern of gender gap as
controls are added. This indicates that Norwegian men are employed in occu-
pations and industries that are characterised by higher wages. In Sweden the
reverse is true: adding controls increases the gap. It suggests that gender gap is
induced by occupation and industry. Moreover, it might indicate that Sweden
exhibits wage spreads across occupations and industries, and additionally that
they are segregated by sex. Swedish women tend to populate better paying
occupations and industries but experience relative disadvantage in pay.
These findings are mostly consistent with estimates found in other stud-
ies. However, the Swedish gap found here is somewhat below the results ob-
tained previously. Finnish within-job gender gap was shown in Korkeama¨ki &
Kyyra¨ (2006) to be 6%. Petersen et al. (1997) reported a within occupation–
establishment white-collar gap of 6.2% in Norway in 1990. As found in Milgrom
et al. (2001), in 1990 Swedish white-collar employees excluding managers ex-
perienced a within occupation–establishment gap of 5%. Despite representing
different points of time, the estimates are strikingly similar across studies. It
speaks volumes about the persistence of the gender gaps even in the Nordic
countries.
Education data is available for a subset of 5389 Finnish observations and is
reported on an ISCED compliant scale. In order to test whether it affects the
gender gap when all other controls are available, this subset was regressed with
and without education. Fixed wage regression with and without education data
resulted in gender gaps of .060 (.004) and .055 (.004), respectively, with standard
deviations in parentheses. These marginal differences in estimates indicate that
education does not affect gender gap considerably after other relevant controls
are present. As Nordic countries share broadly similar labour market institu-
tions, it could be argued that the absence of education data in Norway and
Sweden should not compromise their estimates.
5.2 Fixed wage with STIs
Estimates for OLS regressions with STIs are presented in Table (4). STIs have
substantial effects on gender gaps in Finland and Norway. In Sweden their
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influence is insignificant. With the most narrow set of controls – Model (1) –
the gaps in Finland, Norway and Sweden are .080, .086 and .025, respectively.
Relative to fixed wage regressions, the inclusion of STIs therefore accentuates
the between-country differences.
Again Finland and Norway show similar OLS gender gaps although their
raw wage gaps are of unequal magnitudes. Hence relatively larger share of the
gender gap is explained by the controlled factors in Finland than in Norway. In
Sweden substantial part of the raw gender gap is explained away by even the
most narrow set of controls. As in the previous case, adding controls increases
the gap – it again suggests that Swedish female employees work in above average
paying occupations and industries.
With full set of controls the gaps reach .081, .063 and .036 in Finland, Norway
and Sweden, respectively. However, the relative order of between-country gender
gaps while including STIs remain unchanged. Adding occupational and industry
controls changes the magnitudes but do not warrant for different qualitative
conclusions compared to the fixed wage setting. Hence especially for Finland
and Norway STIs represent mostly a level-shift in gender gaps. In relative terms
the differences are most significant in Norway, where the inclusion of STIs can
increase gender gap by .03 log points over the fixed wage OLS estimates. In
Sweden the increases over fixed wage gaps are less marked and just significant.
Finland comes somewhere between.
Given the tentative evidence of STI policies described above, these patterns
were to certain degree expected. In Norway male employees were shown to have
2 percentage points higher target-level incentives and higher eligibility than
females. Men in Finland have advantage in eligibility. In Sweden the lower
STI eligibility among men is compensated by higher fixed wage to result in
practically unchanged gender gap between the two pay elements. The incentive
policies are hence consistent with the findings presented in Table (4).
The inclusion of STIs has elevated the Finnish and Norwegian gender gaps
above the 5 to 6% reported in previous studies. Although the findings presented
here might be distorted by the over-representation of professionals and managers
in the sample, they invariably point to a direction where performance pay should
not be considered gender-neutral.
5.3 Total compensation
When LTIs and benefits are included, estimates of the gender wage gaps increase
in all Nordic countries. OLS estimates for total compensation gaps are presented
in Table (5). As with STIs, invoking benefits and LTIs represent a level shift in
gender gaps – all estimates irrespective of controls increase. Model (1) results in
gender gaps of .081, .095 and .048 in Finland, Norway and Sweden, respectively.
Especially Sweden experiences a substantial relative increase in the gender gap.
A range of possible explanations could potentially account for these results.
First, the provision of employee benefits and/or LTIs might simply be male-
biased between occupations and industries in Norway and Sweden. Second,
these biases could take place within occupations and industries. Third, relatively
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small number of very high LTI values could result in abnormally high OLS
gender gap estimates. All three explanations are likely to contribute to the
increasing gap found in Norway and Sweden. Some indication of these effects
are found in the raw gender gap figures presented in Table (1). As can be
seen, the inclusion of benefits and LTIs increase the raw gender gap in Sweden
considerably.
However, it is somewhat puzzling that Finland does not fit this pattern –
namely, that the raw wage gaps are relatively unaffected by the pay elements.
It is perhaps symptomatic that as the gender gap differences between pay el-
ements in Finland are relatively low compared to other Nordic countries, a
priori it should not be expected to result in drastic changes among OLS gender
gap estimates. Only industry controls invoke changes that are just statistically
significant.
Model (2) accounts for the variation between occupations. In Norway the
introduction of these controls results in decline of the total compensation gen-
der gap – this implies that male-biased occupations are associated with higher
prevalence of benefits and/or LTIs. The reverse is true in Sweden where Model
(2) shows larger gap than Model (1). This indicates that female-biased occupa-
tions are associated with higher prevalence of benefits and/or LTIs.
Model (3) accounts for the variation between occupations and industries. In
Finland the gender gap increase between Model (2) and (3) is just significant,
and suggests that benefits and/or LTIs are more prevalent in industries with
above average female participation. Norway shows a reduction in the gender
gap indicating that male-biased industries are associated with higher prevalence
of benefits and/or LTIs. In Sweden the difference between Models (2) and (3)
is within the margin of error.
6 Job performance
In this section a slight detour to job performance is made. However experimen-
tal the approach, the intention is to alleviate the absence of job performance
data. The idea is to extract job performance evidence from actual promotion
patterns. Two issues are explored: job performance’s effect on gender gaps and
its influence on pay irrespective of gender. As will turn out the second point,
performance premium, is much more interesting. Despite the term ‘job perfor-
mance’, the operationalisation here is unable to identify between performance
and ability. Hence it remains obscure if fast promotions result from outstanding
individual ability and/or job performance. In similar vein low-performers might
just prefer slower career progression.
High-performers are identified by interacting the variables job ladder and
age. In particular, employees whose job ladder is above 60 below the age of 40
are deemed high-performing. Broadly speaking, fast promotion have provided
these employees executive team responsibilities early at their careers.
Low-performers are master’s degree holders of over 40 years of age with job
ladder below 52. Hence, irrespective of academic qualifications and seniority,
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low-performers have not been promoted more than once during their careers.
They work at best in non-senior professional positions.
An apparent problem with these formulations is that older (younger) em-
ployees can not be considered high-performing (low-performing). Furthermore,
the promotion patterns must be assumed non-discriminatory from the gender
perspective6. Yet rudimentary as this method is, it should provide some indi-
cation of the link between pay and job performance.
As can be seen from Table (6), the shares of high-performing employees are
quite similar between the Nordic countries. They number from .5 to .9% of the
total workforces, and the eligibility is, therefore, quite strict. High-performers
represent the top 1 to 2% of their cohort. Low-performers in Finland amount
to 3.6% of all observations.
As can be observed, the fixed wage gender gaps in Norway and Sweden
remain intact. Only in Finland does it decrease from .066 to .056. Taken with
face value this could suggest that part of the Finnish gender gap can be explained
by the lower job performance of women. However, ‘glass ceilings’ can potentially
hinder women’s career development irrespective of their true job performance.
The conclusion, then, is only suggestive at best.
The job performance coefficients themselves look much more interesting
since they evidence very different patterns across the Nordics. In Finland high-
performers are compensated in line with others, yet low-performers have a sta-
tistically significant pay premium of .053. The sign of the low-performer coef-
ficient is rather counter-intuitive. In Norway the high performance coefficient
is -.035 which could suggest of a minor if statistically insignificant penalty for
high-performers. However, the picture is completely different in Sweden where
the high-performers face a highly significant negative coefficient of -.165. It
seems, therefore, that high-performers are severely punished in the egalitarian
Sweden. This finding is robust to wage elements which is notable, since STIs
and especially LTIs could be used to increase retention among high-performers
in particular. Actually the opposite is true. Quite startlingly with total com-
pensation the Swedish job performance coefficient at -.218 is even more punitive
than with fixed wage.
Disturbingly, most performance coefficients are of the wrong sign. High (low)
job performance should rewarded (penalised) but Finland and Sweden tend to
experience the opposite. However, these results are not without many caveats.
7 Conclusions
The central finding of this paper is that Nordic countries experience gender
gaps of unequal magnitudes. OLS estimates show that Finland and Norway
have substantially higher gender gaps than Sweden. These results are robust to
pay elements and/or occupational and industry controls. Raw wage gaps of .196,
.136 and .155 for Finland, Norway and Sweden, respectively, reduce to .066, .059
and .032. These declines imply that large parts of the Nordic gender gaps can
6Reflecting on Figure (1) this assumption is potentially very heroic.
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be explained away by sex segregation in job ladders, occupations and industries.
Furthermore, incentives tend to accentuate the between-country polarisation –
indeed with STIs the differentials reach .081 and .063 in Finland and Norway,
respectively, but .036 in Sweden. These results are consistent with the findings
concerning incentives, namely that in Finland and Norway eligibilities and/or
target-levels are male-biased.
Incentives and benefits tend to pronounce within-country gender gaps among
Nordic MNCs. Most striking evidence can be seen in Norway and Sweden, where
gender gaps almost double when moving from fixed wage to total compensation.
Especially in Sweden the provisions of LTIs and benefits are strongly male-
biased. In Finland gender gaps are less sensitive to pay elements, which is
already evident from the raw figures. With full controls the total compensation
gaps reach .086, .072 and .056 in Finland, Norway and Sweden, respectively.
It is interesting to note the disparities between raw and OLS gender wage
gaps in Norway and Sweden. Raw fixed wage and total compensation gender
gaps are higher in Sweden than in Norway. This is consistent with OECD
estimates based on a more representative sample (Kahn, 2010). However, with
OLS the pattern reverses – Norway has higher gender gaps irrespective of the
pay element. These imply that Sweden experiences more pronounced between-
gender human capital, occupational and industry differentials. To great length
they explain the larger raw gaps found in Sweden. Hence it could be argued
that Norway has simultaneously less ‘discriminatory’ labour market institutions
– for example, smaller job ladder gap – but pay policies that put women at
disadvantage. Sweden seems to have the opposite situation.
Of the Nordic countries, Finland has consistently highest raw gender gaps.
With few exceptions, also its OLS gaps top the Nordic figures. However, Finnish
gender gaps are largely unaffected by the occupation and industry controls.
These imply that between-occupation and between-industry wage differentials
are relatively low in Finland. Consequently, and corroborating with evidence in
Korkeama¨ki & Kyyra¨ (2006), the majority of the raw gender gap is explained by
between-gender differentials in job ladders. As is already evident from Figure
(1), Finnish women are employed in substantially less demanding jobs than men.
A very rudimentary promotion-based method to identify high- and low-
performers is utilised. The findings suggest that high-performers are penalised
in Sweden by premium of -.165. Finland and Norway do not evidence anything
alike. However, low-performers are rewarded with a pay premium of .056 in Fin-
land. Although more elaborate approach is needed, these results are thought-
provoking since the coefficients are of wrong sign. Intuitively high-performers
should be rewarded and low-performers penalised.
Norway holds an important policy lesson regarding the persistence of gender
gaps. Despite being able to the decimate the sex segregation in job ladders –
which is often cited as being the single most important source of the gender gap
– wages have not equalised. This could suggest that removing ‘class ceilings’
might not be enough to counter the gender gap.
The findings presented here indicate that incentives are not gender-neutral
even among the Nordic MNCs. Indeed the gender gaps are frequently more
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sensitive to pay elements than to occupation or industry controls. As increas-
ing share of compensation comprise of incentives, the dynamic development of
gender gap is ambiguous – the slow gradual decline might even reverse.
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Appendix
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Finland Norway Sweden
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Pay element
Fixed wage 45061 54828 484463 555417 427726 499869
(18929) (24700) (188615) (247640) (177030) (279352)
Fixed wage with STI 47244 58613 514484 609307 448594 528916
(21188) (30235) (222250) (298276) (197097) (337746)
Total compensation 48497 60515 580920 699259 515330 640834
(23937) (34154) (277924) (368066) (285441) (491635)
Gap
Fixed wage .821 .872 .855
Fixed wage with STI .806 .844 .848
Total compensation .801 .830 .804
Log gap
Fixed wage .196 .136 .155
Fixed wage with STI .215 .169 .164
Total compensation .221 .185 .217
Demographics
Age (years) 42.13 43.02 40.12 42.56 42.39 44.33
Tenure (years) 12.17 12.88 8.294 9.900 11.44 13.79
Job ladder 50.46 52.58 49.43 50.43 50.12 52.11
Sample data
Sample size 6093 14996 1814 4399 9681 19178
Total sample size 21089 6213 28859
Companies 138 110 191
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Gap is calculated as (female wage / male wage). Log gap
equals log(male wage / female wage). Fixed is contractual wage absent overtime pay, commissions or
allowances. Fixed with STIs includes the actual value of short-term incentives. Total compensation
comprises adds long-term incentives and benefits, respectively. All pay elements represent annual
figures in local currency. Job ladders correspond roughly to the following positions: ≤ 46 assistant
or clerical; 47–49 junior professional; 50–53 professional; 54–57 senior professional; 55–59 manager;
60–62 director; 63–67 top management; ≥ 68 chief executive.
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Table 2: Short- and long-term incentive pay policies
Variable Finland Norway Sweden
Gender gap
Eligibility for STI .217*** .110 -.261***
(.058) (.076) (0.040)
Target-level STI -.206 .200*** .124
(.143) (.044) (.077)
Overall
Eligibility for LTI 4.6% 2.5% 4.3%
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Eligibil-
ity indicates the gender difference in STI eligibility ob-
tained with logistic regression. The figure is in log
points. Target-level STI is the gender gap in target-
level payment of incentive scheme and is presented in
percentage points. Eligibility for LTI shows the overall
share of employees with long-term incentives.
Table 3: Regression estimates with fixed wage
Finland Norway Sweden
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 6.485*** 6.997*** 7.036*** 8.902*** 9.717*** 9.633*** 11.88*** 12.23*** 12.19***
(0.12) (0.125) (0.125) (0.18) (0.185) (0.188) (0.072) (0.078) (0.078)
Job ladder -0.035*** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.019** -0.047*** -0.043*** -0.14*** -0.149*** -0.149***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Job ladder sq. 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Age 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.03*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age sq. 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Tenure -0.001** -0.001 0 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002* -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.002***
(0) (0) (0) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0) (0) (0)
Tenure sq. 0 0* 0* 0 0* 0 0*** 0*** 0
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Male 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.059*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.021*** 0.037*** 0.032***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Controls
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.8057 0.816 0.8199 0.758 0.7905 0.8042 0.8325 0.8441 0.8493
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. *** significant at 0.1%, ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5% and . significant at
10%. Occupational and industry codes broadly resemble Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) and North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS), respectively.
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Table 4: Regression estimates with fixed wage and STIs
Finland Norway Sweden
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 9.83*** 10.34*** 10.34*** 11.67*** 12.85*** 12.46*** 15.53*** 15.57*** 15.47***
(0.133) (0.139) (0.14) (0.203) (0.211) (0.212) (0.078) (0.084) (0.084)
Job ladder -0.067*** -0.081*** -0.08*** -0.038*** -0.079*** -0.064*** -0.186*** -0.18*** -0.178***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Job ladder sq. 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Age 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age sq. 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Tenure 0*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0 0 0.001 -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(0) (0) (0) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0) (0) (0)
Tenure sq. 0 0 0. 0* 0 0. 0* 0 0*
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Male 0.08*** 0.075*** 0.081*** 0.086*** 0.074*** 0.063*** 0.025*** 0.041*** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Controls
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.7772 0.7877 0.7927 0.7328 0.763 0.7827 0.8256 0.8381 0.8422
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. *** significant at 0.1%, ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5% and . significant at
10%. Occupational and industry codes broadly resemble Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) and North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS), respectively.
Table 5: Regression estimates with total compensation
Finland Norway Sweden
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 10.6*** 11.04*** 11.06*** 11.82*** 13.41*** 13.01*** 16.99*** 17.07*** 17.01***
(0.138) (0.145) (0.145) (0.221) (0.225) (0.225) (0.093) (0.101) (0.101)
Job ladder -0.1*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.047*** -0.105*** -0.087*** -0.246*** -0.243*** -0.243***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Job ladder sq. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Age 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age sq. 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Tenure 0*** 0*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0) (0) (0) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0) (0) (0)
Tenure sq. 0 0 0 0* 0* 0** 0*** 0*** 0***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Male 0.081** 0.080*** 0.086*** 0.095*** 0.084** 0.072*** 0.048** 0.059*** 0.056***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Controls
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.7799 0.7898 0.7946 0.7282 0.7697 0.7912 0.8055 0.8197 0.8224
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. *** significant at 0.1%, ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5% and . significant at
10%. Occupational and industry codes broadly resemble Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) and North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS), respectively.
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Table 6: Regression estimates with job performance and fixed wage
Variable Finland Norway Sweden
Intercept 6.138*** 9.6543*** 12.3966***
(-0.271) (0.1884) (0.0783)
Job level -0.015 -0.0435*** -0.158***
(0.01) (0.0076) (0.003)
Job level sq. 0.027*** 0.0009*** 0.0021***
(0.002) (0.0001) (0)
Age 0.027*** 0.0344*** 0.0217***
(0.002) (0.0017) (0.0008)
Age sq. -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002***
(0) (0) (0)
Tenure -0.003*** -0.0017* -0.0024***
(0.001) (0.0008) (0.0003)
Tenure sq. 0. 0 0.
(0) (0) (0)
Male 0.056*** 0.0394*** 0.0323***
(0.005) (0.0049) (0.0021)
High performance 0.006 -0.0356 -0.1653***
(0.024) (0.0297) (0.0096)
Low performance 0.053***
(0.0112)
Controls
Region Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.8356 0.8042 0.8506
Observations
High perf. (abs.) 37 31 258
High perf. (rel.) 0.0068 0.0049 0.0089
Low perf. (abs.) 195
Low perf. (rel.) 0.0361
Sample size 5389 6213 28859
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. *** significant at
0.1%, ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5% and . signifi-
cant at 10%. Occupational and industry codes broadly resemble
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) and North Amer-
ican Industry Classification System (NAICS), respectively.
High performance: job ladder ≥ 60 X age ≤ 40
Low performance: job ladder ≤ 52 X age ≥ 40 X education ≥
5 (Min. master’s degree).
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Figure 1: Job ladder profiles in the Nordic countries, kernel bandwidth 2
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